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The Louisiana Purchase: Indian and American Sovereignty
in the Missouri Watershed
Kent McNeil
This paper has now been published: Kent McNeil, “The Louisiana Purchase: Indian and
American Sovereignty in the Missouri Watershed” (2019) 50:1 Western Historical
Quarterly 17-42,
https://academic.oup.com/whq/advancearticle/doi/10.1093/whq/why135/5231578?guestAccessKey=e2ea54c6-af2b-4eaa-b13d54553eae2752

Like a historical mantra repeated time and again, it is asserted that the Louisiana
Purchase doubled the size of the United States.1 As this assertion takes for granted that
the Purchase included the entire Missouri watershed, it rests on the assumption that
France had a valid title thereto because, as a matter of common sense and international
law, France could only convey title to territory that it actually owned.2 But what basis is
there for the assumption that France had sovereign title to the vast territory drained by the
Missouri River that stretches from the Mississippi River to the Rocky Mountains? In
actual fact, at the time of the Purchase in 1803 most of that territory had not even been
explored, let alone possessed, by the French – it was occupied and controlled by many
Indian nations, over whom France exercised no authority. As France clearly did not
exercise de facto sovereignty over the Missouri watershed, any claim it had to the vast
territory would have had to be a claim to de jure sovereignty based on law that did not
depend on actual occupation and control. If so, what system of law could have given

Distinguished Research Professor, York University, Toronto. I would like to thank Brent Arnold,
Michael Burke, Ryan Gibson, and Dan McCabe for their indispensible research assistance, the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and Killam Trusts for their financial support, and
Paul Mapp, Michel Morin, Kathy Simo, and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.
1
E.g. see Merrill D. Peterson, “Louisiana!”, in Dolores Egger Labbe, ed., The Louisiana Purchase
Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History, vol. III, The Louisiana Purchase and Its Aftermath, 1800-1830
(Lafayette, 1998), 20 at 31; D.W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500
Years of History (New Haven, 1993), vol. 2 , 11-12; Peter J. Kastor & François Weil, eds., Empires of the
Imagination: Transatlantic Histories of the Louisiana Purchase (Charlottesville, 2009), 2.
2
On the fundamental international law principle that a state cannot transfer territorial title that it
does not have, see Island of Palmas Case, (1928) 2 R.I.A.A. 829, at 842; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law, 6th ed. (Oxford, 2003), 120-21; Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 7th ed.
(Cambridge, 2014), 360-61. Application of this principle to the Louisiana Purchase and France’s claim to
Texas was acknowledged by Eugene C. Barker, Review of Pichardo’s Treatise on the Limits of Louisiana
and Texas, edited by Charles Wilson Hackett, (1931) 35 Southwestern Hist. Q. 243, at 243.
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France legal title to this immense territory, most of which no Frenchman had ever laid
eyes on?
This article will probe, and attempt to answer, the troubling and too often
neglected question of France’s title to the Missouri watershed. Our discussion and
analysis will rely on the vital distinction between de facto and de jure sovereignty.
Assessing claims to de facto sovereignty is an empirical matter that depends on actual
possession, control, and exercise of authority on the ground. As such, it is a subject for
historical investigation. Assessment of claims to de jure sovereignty, on the other hand,
necessarily involves deciding at the outset which body of law to apply, which raises a
normative issue of moral and political philosophy: Which body of law should apply in the
circumstances?3 Once that has been determined, a de jure assessment entails legal
analysis in accordance with relevant principles and rules from the chosen body of law.
While this analysis will obviously take known historical facts into account, it must be
kept clearly in mind that, unlike de facto sovereignty, de jure sovereignty is a matter of
mixed fact and law, not to be determined by historical methodology alone. In other
words, it depends on the application of a particular body of legal rules to ascertained
facts. This article will critically assess the validity of France’s claim to territorial
sovereignty over the Missouri watershed from both a de facto and a de jure perspective.
This assessment will lead to a re-evaluation of the geographical extent of the Louisiana
Purchase on the Northern Plains.
1.

Sovereignty and the Indian Nations

Considered factually, sovereignty entails the actual exercise of political or governmental
authority over peoples, or more commonly over peoples and territories (hence the term
“territorial sovereignty”) that are subject to that authority. De facto sovereignty’s
essential characteristic is the existence of an organized society that has political authority

See Mark D. Walters, “The Morality of Aboriginal Law” (2006) 31 Queen’s Law J. 470; Burke A.
Hendrix, Ownership, Authority, and Self-Determination: Moral Principles and Indigenous Rights Claims
(University Park, PA, 2008); Shiri Pasternak, “Jurisdiction and Settler Colonialism: Where Do Laws
Meet?” (2014) 29:2 Can. J. of Law and Society 145.
3
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and is factually independent.4 Claims to de facto sovereignty can be assessed on this basis
in historical and present contexts by factual investigation. As there is no need to resort to
law, the criteria for de facto sovereignty can be applied universally, without entering into
the normative question of whether it is appropriate to apply a particular body of law to a
given people or territory.
In this context, it is also essential to distinguish between territorial sovereignty
and title to land. Whereas the former involves the exercise of governmental authority by a
political entity (the sovereign), the latter is a form of property that can be held, in EuroAmerican systems of law, either privately by individuals and corporations or publicly by
governments (the property owners). Territorial sovereignty and title to land are therefore
conceptually and legally distinct, which is why individuals and corporations can have
private property rights in lands that are under the territorial sovereignty of the United
States. This article is concerned with territorial sovereignty, not title to land.5
It is often assumed that European claims to territorial sovereignty in North
America during the period of colonization have to be evaluated on the basis of the law of
nations, now called international law. This is a de jure approach involving an initial
choice of law that ignores the reality that the Indigenous peoples of this continent had
(and have) their own systems of law that would be more relevant for assessing their de
jure sovereignty.6 The justification for the sole application of the law of nations in this

See Kent McNeil, “Sovereignty and Indigenous Peoples in North America” (2016) 22:2 UC Davis
J. of International Law & Policy 81. On the concept of sovereignty, see Charles Edward Merriam, History
of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau (New York, 1972); F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge, 1986); John Hoffman, Sovereignty (Minneapolis, 1998); Lauren Benton, A Search for
Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 (Cambridge, 2010).
5
On Indigenous land rights, see Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford, 1989);
Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Sydney, 2008); Ulla Secher,
Aboriginal Customary Law: A Source of Common Law Title to Land (Oxford, 2014). On the distinction
between sovereignty and title to land, see Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, 1758, trans. by Charles
G. Fenwick (Washington, 1916), 84; John Westlake, International Law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1910), vol. 1,
86-90; Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London, 1966), 99, 625-36. For an
informative recent article that regrettably does not take this distinction into sufficient account, see Robert
Lee, “Accounting for Conquest: The Price of the Lousiana Purchase of Indian Country” (2017) 103:4 J. of
Am. Hist. 921.
6
See Daniel K. Richter & James H. Merrell, eds., Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and
Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800 (Syracuse, 1987); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Linking
Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and Peace, 1600-1800 (New York, 1997);
Theodore Binnema, Common and Contested Ground: A Human and Environmental History of the
Northwestern Plains (Norman, 2001); Taiaiake Alfred, “Sovereignty”, in Joanne Baker, ed., Sovereignty
4
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context rests on two premises, both of which are wrong: first, that the Indigenous peoples
were inferior to Europeans and incapable of exercising sovereignty in accordance with
their own systems of law; and second, that the law of nations was universal because it
was based on natural law.7 The first premise is obviously racist and false. The second
premise is also false, especially in the context of colonization, because this aspect of the
law of nations was formulated by European nations and jurists, partly to justify European
colonial claims.8 Their self-serving resort to universally applicable natural law therefore
rings hollow. Moreover, by the nineteenth century the ascendancy of legal positivism led
most European jurists to acknowledge and accept that what by then was known as
international law was a body of rules developed by European nations, principally through
customary practices and conventions, not by resort to universally applicable norms. As
such, it would have applied principally to European nations and their overseas
counterparts, such as the United States and the Latin American states after they became
independent, to regulate relations among themselves. It would not have applied to other
peoples in the world who did not participate in its formation or consent to be bound by
it.9
Given that the essential ingredient of de facto sovereignty is the existence of an
organized, independent political society, there can be no doubt that the Indigenous
peoples of North America were sovereign. Prior to European colonization, they were
organized as nations and exercised independent authority over their internal and external
affairs, as well as over specific territories.10 This reality was in fact accepted by Chief

Matters: Locations of Contestation and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determination
(Lincoln, 2005), 33.
7
See E.B.F. Midgley, The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations (New
York, 1975); R.P. Anand, Confrontation or Cooperation? International Law and the Developing Countries
(Dordrecht, 1987), 13-15; S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 2nd ed. (New York,
2004), 15-31.
8
See Max Savelle, Empires to Nations: Expansion in America, 1713-1824 (Minneapolis, 1974),
138-43; Anand, above n.7, 19-31; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of
International Law (Cambridge, 2005).
9
See William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1884), 40; C.H.
Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies (16 th, 17th and 18th
Centuries) (Oxford, 1967).
10
See Robert H. Lowie, Indians of the Plains (1954, reprinted Lincoln, 1982); Edwin Thompson
Denig, Five Indian Tribes of the Upper Missouri: Sioux, Arikaras, Assiniboines, Crees, Crows, edited by
John C. Ewers (Norman, 1961); Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of
Early America (Cambridge, MA, 2001); Binnema, above n.6; Colin G. Calloway, One Vast Winter Count:
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Justice John Marshall in three early judgments of the United States Supreme Court, and
has become a fundamental tenet of federal Indian law. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, decided in
1823, Marshall said that the Indians’ “rights to complete sovereignty, as independent
nations, were necessarily diminished” by the principle “that discovery gave title to the
[European] government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against
all other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.”11
This title by discovery was not just to territorial sovereignty; it was also proprietary, as it
gave the discovering European government a right of pre-emption that prevented other
Europeans as well as its own subjects from acquiring Indian lands.12
In the second case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Marshall decided in 1831 that
the Indian tribes, after incorporation within the acknowledged boundaries of the United
States, were “domestic dependent nations” rather than foreign nations.13 A year later in
Worcester v. Georgia, he again acknowledged the pre-existing de facto sovereignty of the
Indian nations:
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct
people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of
the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their
own laws.14
He also clarified that the discovery principle applied only among the European powers:
It was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition among those
who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the previous rights of those who
had not agreed to it. It regulated the right given by discovery among the European
discoverers, but could not affect the rights of those [the Indian nations] already in
possession.15
The Native American West Before Lewis and Clark (Lincoln, 2003); James H. Merrell, “Second Thoughts
on Colonial Historians and American Indians” (2012) 69:3 William and Mary Quarterly 451 at 478-83.
11
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), 573-74. For critical discussion, see Robert J.
Miller et al., Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies (Oxford,
2010). For background to Johnson v. M’Intosh, see Lindsay G. Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the
Discovery of America Dispossessed the Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands (New York, 2005).
12
Johnson v. M’Intosh, above n.11. See Kent McNeil, “Self-Government and the Inalienability of
Aboriginal Title” (2002) 47 McGill Law J. 473 at 487-502.
13
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), 17.
14
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), 542-53.
15
Ibid. at 544. Marshall C.J.’s restated position is consistent with the principle that customary
international law applies only to the community that created it and the rule that treaties bind only the
parties. On custom, see Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making, 7th ed. (Oxford, 1964), 67-160. On the
rule respecting treaties, expressed by the maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, see Lord McNair, The
Law of Treaties (Oxford, 1961), 309-21; Brownlie, above n.2, 598-600.
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Thus, for the complete sovereignty and land ownership that the Indian nations had
enjoyed prior to the arrival of Europeans to be diminished, something more than mere
discovery was required: the discovering European nation had to consummate its title by
bringing the Indian nations and their territories under its dominion, which could be
accomplished by conquest or treaty. After that occurred, the Indian nations nonetheless
retained their title to any lands that had not been taken by or surrendered to the European
nation in question or subsequently the United States, and also retained their internal
sovereignty and authority to govern themselves and their remaining territories.16

2.

The Louisiana Purchase

Turning to the Missouri watershed, numerous Indian nations, including the Arapaho,
Arikara, Assiniboine, Blackfoot, Cheyenne, Crow, Grow Ventre, Hidatsa, Iowa, Kansa,
Mandan, Missouria, Omaha, Osage, Otoe, Pawnee, Ponca, and Sioux nations, occupied
the region as independent political entities at the time of the arrival of Europeans.17 They
would therefore have met the criteria for de facto sovereignty outlined above.18
Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that these nations are now within the territorial limits
of the United States. So how and when did this occur? The standard answer, as already
mentioned, is that the whole of the Missouri watershed became part of the United States
in 1803 as a result of the Louisiana Purchase.19 This response is based on the

16

Worcester v. Georgia, above n.14, especially 557-61. See also Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556
(1883); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004);
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, Nell Jessup Newton, ed. (New Providence, NJ, 2012), §15.04.
17
See Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 13, Plains, edited by Raymond J. DeMallie
(Washington, 2001), especially the map at ix, and works cited in n.10 above.
18
See Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, An Indigenous Peoples’ History of the United States (Boston, 2014),
especially 25. Although the political and social organization of these nations varied greatly from that of
European nations, de facto sovereignty depends, not on internal organization, but on effective control by
independent political entities over peoples, or more commonly over peoples and territories, the boundaries
of which do not need to be fixed or clearly defined. See the works cited in n.4 above.
19
In addition to the works cited in n.1 above, see Jon Kukla, A Wilderness So Immense: The
Louisiana Purchase and the Destiny of America (New York, 2003), especially 286-87, 415 n.6; Peter J.
Kastor, The Great Acquisition: An Introduction to the Louisiana Purchase (Great Falls, 2003), especially
14; The Nation’s Crucible: The Louisiana Purchase and the Creation of America (New Haven, 2004),
especially 3-6, 42, 204-5. Compare Vine Deloria, Jr., “Frenchmen, Bears, and Sandbars”, in Alvin M.
Josephy, Jr., ed., Lewis and Clark Through Indian Eyes (New York, 2007), 5; Richard White, “The
Louisiana Purchase and the Fictions of Empire”, in Kastor & Weil, above n.1, 37.
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questionable assumption that France had territorial sovereignty over the entire Missouri
watershed immediately prior to transferring Louisiana to the United States.
The legality of the Louisiana Purchase was contested on two main grounds. First,
Spain contended that the Purchase violated a promise by France not to alienate the
territory. Spanish protests against the Purchase were, however, brushed aside by the
United States, and were soon dropped in favour of a Spanish diplomatic strategy of
limiting the boundaries of Louisiana in the west, southwest and southeast.20 A more
serious question was raised in the United States, where some politicians doubted that the
federal government had the constitutional authority to extend the boundaries of the
Republic by purchasing additional territory. President Thomas Jefferson himself
entertained serious doubts of this kind, and considered a constitutional amendment to
deal with the problem, but in the end diplomatic concerns and political pressures
prevailed over his constitutional scruples.21 The matter was resolved in the debates over
the Purchase in Congress, where both the Federalists and, more incongruously, the
Republicans, eventually accepted that the United States could acquire additional territory
by purchase or conquest.22
It is not my intention to question the legal validity of the Louisiana Purchase on
these or other grounds. For present purposes, I accept that France had good title to some
See Charles Wilson Hackett, ed., Pichardo’s Treatise on the Limits of Louisiana and Texas, 4
vols. (Austin, 1931-46); Thomas Maitland Marshall, A History of the Western Boundary of the Louisiana
Purchase, 1819-1841 (Berkeley, 1914), 18-19; E. Wilson Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy, 17591804 (1934, reprinted Norman, 1974), 231-50; Léon Sarpy, “The Louisiana Purchase, Its Title Legality”
(1964) 12 Louisiana Bar J. 301; Alexander DeConde, This Affair of Louisiana (New York, 1976), 193-208;
J.C.A. Stagg, Borderlines in Borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish-American Frontier, 1776-1821
(New Haven, 2009).
21
See Jefferson to John Breckinridge, Senator from Kentucky, 12 August 1803, in Merrill D.
Peterson, ed., The Portable Thomas Jefferson (New York, 1977), 494 at 497; David N. Mayer, The
Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson (Charlottesville, 1994), 244-51.
22
See Henry Adams, History of the United States During the First Administration of Thomas
Jefferson (1891-96, reprinted New York, 1962), vol. 2, 78-115; Everett Somerville Brown, The
Constitutional History of the Louisiana Purchase, 1803-1812 (Berkeley, 1920), 14-83; Dumas Malone,
Jefferson and His Time, vol. 4, Jefferson the President: First Term, 1801-1805 (Boston, 1970), 311-32;
Peter A. Appel, “The Louisiana Purchase and the Lewis & Clark Expedition: A Constitutional Moment?”,
in Kris Fresonke and Mark Spence, Lewis & Clark: Legacies, Memories, and New Perspectives (Berkeley,
2004), 87. The Supreme Court affirmed constitutional authority to acquire new territory in Sere v. Pitot, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 332 (1810), 336-37; American Insurance Company v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
511 (1828), 542; Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1903), 140. On whether the Purchase met
international law standards, see Stéphane Beaulac, “Vattel’s Doctrine on Territory Transfers in
International Law and the Cession of Louisiana to the United States of America” (2003) 63 Louisiana Law
Rev. 1327.
20
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territory and that it validly conveyed that title to the United States in 1803. My concern is
with the boundaries of the transferred territory, particularly in the north and west, and the
assumption that the territory encompassed the whole of the Missouri watershed. This
involves tracing France’s title back to its origins, and evaluating this assumption in light
of the de facto sovereignty of the Indian nations who inhabited the region.
The treaty between France and the United States that gave effect to the Louisiana
Purchase is of no real assistance in determining the territory’s extent. Despite deliberate
attempts by Robert Livingston and James Monroe, the American negotiators in Paris, to
get a definition of the boundaries in the treaty, the French refused to provide one.23
Consequently, the treaty stated simply that France ceded to the United States “for ever
and in full Sovereignty the said territory [Louisiana] with all its rights and appurtenances
as fully and in the Same manner as they have been acquired by the French Republic in
virtue of the above mentioned Treaty concluded with his Catholic Majesty.”24 The treaty
referred to in this clause was the Treaty of San Ildefonso, concluded in 1800, whereby the
King of Spain had transferred Louisiana back to France, “with the Same extent that it
now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it; and Such as it
Should be after the Treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other States.”25
France had possessed Louisiana prior to the Treaty of Fontainebleau in 1762, whereby
she undertook to cede to Spain “all the country known by the name of Louisiana, as well
as New Orléans and the island on which that town is situated.”26 Beyond New Orléans

23

See François Barbé-Marbois, The History of Louisiana (1830, republished Baton Rouge, 1977),
283-86; Marshall, above n.20, 8; DeConde, above n.20, 169-70; Kukla, above n.19, especially 286-87, 415
n.6.
24
Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana between France and the United States, Paris, 30 April 1803,
Art. 1, in Clive Parry, ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series (Dobbs Ferry, NY), vol. 57 (1969), 27 at 31.
25
Preliminary and Secret Treaty between France and Spain, concluded at San Ildefonso, 1 October
1800, Art. 3, in Frances Gardiner Davenport & Charles Oscar Paullin, eds., European Treaties bearing on
the History of the United States and its Dependencies (Gloucester, MA), vol. 4 (1967), 181, as translated in
Art. 1 of the Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, above n.24, 30. On the Treaty of San Ildefonso, see
Adams, above n.22, vol. 1, 352-76; Arthur Preston Whitaker, The Mississippi Question, 1795-1803: A
Study in Trade, Politics, and Diplomacy (Gloucester, MA, 1962), 176-86.
26
Preliminary Act of Cession between France and Spain, Fontainebleau, 3 November 1762, in
Davenport & Paullin, above n.25, vol. 4, 91 (my translation of the French). On whether France and Spain
reached a separate agreement on the bounds of Louisiana in the southwest, see Richard R. Stenberg, “The
Western Boundary of Louisiana, 1762-1803” (1931) 35 Southwestern Hist. Q. 95-108; idem, “The
Boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase” (1934) 14 Hispanic American Hist. Rev. 32-64.
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and the “island” on which it stands, what was the country that France possessed as
Louisiana?27
In attempting to answer this question, it is important to distinguish between the
territory France claimed to possess and the territory she actually possessed. The
assumption that the Louisiana Purchase encompassed the whole of the Missouri
watershed is based on France’s de jure territorial claim, not on the extent to which she
was actually able to make good on that claim by taking de facto possession.28 It is
therefore essential to undertake an assessment of the validity of France’s claim to the
entire Missouri watershed, which depends in turn on the factual and legal bases for that
claim.
3. France’s Claim to the Missouri Watershed

French explorers, missionaries, and fur-traders were the first Europeans to make contact
with the Indian nations inhabiting the Missouri watershed. Before the establishment of
permanent French settlements at New Orléans and along the lower Mississippi Valley,
beginning around 1700, these French visitors were few and far between, and as far as is
known did not venture up the Missouri from the Mississippi. France’s claim to the
Missouri watershed was nonetheless originally based on these explorations, along with
formal assertions of sovereignty by representatives of the French King. In 1671 at Sault
Ste. Marie, far to the north and east, Simon François Daumont, Sieur de Saint-Lusson,
acting upon instructions from Jean Talon, Intendant of New France, formally proclaimed
sovereignty over a vast, vaguely-defined expanse of North America in the name of his
King.29 Before delegates from fourteen Indian nations, he claimed possession of lakes
Huron and Superior “and of all the other countries, rivers, lakes and tributaries,
27

As our focus is on the Missouri watershed, this article does not address the question of the
boundaries between Louisiana and West Florida and Spanish Texas: see French Ensor Chadwick, The
Relations of the United States and Spain: Diplomacy (1909, reissued New York, 1968), 61-85; Marshall,
above n.20; Philip Coolidge Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands: The Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819
(Berkeley, 1939).
28
See White, above n.19; Cécile Vidal, “From Incorporation to Exclusion: Indians, Europeans, and
Americans in the Mississippi Valley from 1699 to 1830”, in Kastor & Weil, above n.1, 62.
29
See Francis Borgia Steck, The Jolliet-Marquette Expedition, 1673 (Glendale, CA, 1928), 125-30;
John Anthony Caruso, The Mississippi Valley Frontier: The Age of French Exploration and Settlement
(Indianapolis, 1966), 151-53.
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contiguous and adjacent thereto, as well discovered as to be discovered, which are
bounded on one side by the North and West Seas and on the other side by the South Sea,
including all their length or depth”.30 This proclamation of territorial sovereignty was
followed by the official journey of Louis Jolliet and Father Jacques Marquette down the
Mississippi from the Wisconsin River as far as mouth of the Arkansas, mainly to
ascertain whether the great river emptied into the South Sea (the Pacific) and to obtain
commercial benefits for France. These explorers were probably the first Europeans to see
the Missouri, at the place where it flows into the Mississippi.31
More significantly for our purpose of ascertaining France’s claim, in 1682 RenéRobert Cavelier, Sieur de La Salle, led a French expedition from the Illinois River down
the Mississippi to its mouth, where he formally took possession in the name of Louis
XIV, by virtue of the commission he had received from him,
… of this country of Louisiana, seas, harbors, ports, bays, and straits
adjacent and all the nations, peoples, provinces, cities, towns, villages,
mines, minerals, fisheries, rivers, and tributaries, encompassed within the
expanse of the said Louisiana, from the mouth of the great river SaintLouis on the east side, also called the Ohio, Olighinsipou ou Chukagoua,
and with the consent of the Chaouesnons, Chicachasas and other peoples
who live there with whom we have made alliance, and also the length of
the river Colbert, or Mississippi, and rivers which flow into it, from its
source on the other side of the country of the Sioux or Nadouesioux, with
their consent and that of the Ototantas, Islinois, Matsigamea, Akansas,
Natchez, Koroas, who are the most important nations who live there, with
whom alliance has been made by ourselves or other Frenchmen, to its
mouth in the sea or gulf of Mexico, … on the assurance from all these
nations that we have been the first Europeans who have descended or
ascended the said river Colbert.32

My translation of “Procès-verbal de la prise de possession des pays situés vers les lacs Huron et
Supérieur”, in Pierre Margry, ed., Voyages des Français sur les grands Lacs et Découverte de l’Ohio et du
Mississipi (1614-1684) (Paris, 1879), 96 at 97. For a complete English translation, see E.B. O’Callaghan,
ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York (Albany), vol. 9 (1855), 803-4.
31
See Steck, above n.29 at 159, 218-19.
32
My translation of French text in Pierre Margry, ed., Lettres de Cavelier de la Salle et
Correspondance relative à ses Enterprises (1678-1685) (Paris: D. Jouaust, 1877), 191-92. A translation of
La Salle’s entire speech is in John W. Monette, History of the Discovery and Settlement of the Valley of the
Mississippi, by the Three Great European Powers, Spain, France and Great Britain (New York, 1846),
vol. 1, 144.
30
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While one can be sceptical of the consent of the Indian nations to this taking of
possession and of their assurances respecting the activities of other Europeans, 33 here at
least was a clear assertion of French sovereignty over the entire Missouri watershed.
Apparently, La Salle was not particularly concerned that no Frenchman had done more
than view the point at which that river flows into the Mississippi from the west.
On what basis, then, should the validity of La Salle’s assertion of sovereignty
over the Missouri watershed be assessed? Obviously, his declaration of French
possession in 1682 was not a descriptive, empirical statement. Rather, it was in the nature
of a legal proclamation that should be evaluated normatively. But what is the appropriate
system of norms to be applied in this context? At least three possibilities present
themselves: French law, the law of the Indian nations who inhabited the Missouri
watershed, and the emerging European law of nations.
Regarding French law, there is no reason why it should determine the question of
sovereignty in a geographical region where few French subjects were present and where
the French King neither exercised nor was capable of exercising authority. While binding
on French subjects, French law could have no application to anyone else in a region
occupied only by Indian nations who had neither accepted nor been brought under French
authority. So even if French law at the time provided for the acquisition of sovereignty by
the kind of declaration La Salle had made,34 examination of that law would not be
particularly useful in attempting to resolve the matter of sovereignty over the Missouri
watershed vis-à-vis anyone other than Frenchmen. Moreover, despite La Salle’s
pretentious claims, it is not at all clear that officials in France thought these kinds of
assertions were effective to give the French King sovereignty over Indigenous peoples in
North America. An indication of this can be found in a memorandum drafted by Gérard
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de Rayneval,35 secretary to Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, the French Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and delivered with a covering letter dated September 6, 1782, to John
Jay, one of the American diplomats who were in France to negotiate the peace treaty that
would end the American War of Independence and recognize the United States as an
independent nation-state.36 Although written a century after La Salle’s assertion of
sovereignty, the memorandum is relevant because it reveals official French thinking on
the extent of Louisiana, specifically the boundary between Louisiana and the territory
Great Britain received from France by the Treaty of Paris of 1763. In it Rayneval wrote
that, prior to this treaty, “France possessed Louisiana and Canada, and she regarded the
savage peoples east of the Mississippi either as independent or as being under her
protection.”37 This admission reveals that, while the European powers made grandiose
territorial claims when dealing with one another, at the same time they acknowledged that
they did not have sovereignty over the Indigenous peoples who actually occupied these
territories. An exchange between John Jay and the Conde de Aranda, the Spanish
Ambassador in Paris, during their negotiations at the same time over the eastern boundary
of Louisiana, confirms that Spain shared this understanding:
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“Few ministers plenipotentiary,” stated Jay [in reference to the territory
between the southern Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi that
Aranda claimed should not be part of the United States], “have
discretionary powers to transfer and cede to others the country of their
sovereigns.”
“But, it isn’t your country,” insisted Aranda. “What right have you to the
territory of the free and independent Indians?”
“The right of preëmption over them, and of sovereignty over them in
respect to other nations, the same as His Catholic Majesty in Mexico and
Peru,” Jay answered. 38
If high-ranking French and Spanish officials had these kinds of doubts in 1782 about their
nations’ sovereignty over the Indigenous peoples east of the Mississippi, where the
European presence was greater than west of that river’s northern reaches,39 surely they
would have maintained at least as strong doubts about their nations’ sovereignty over the
Missouri watershed prior to the cession of Louisiana from Spain to France in 1800 and
from France to the United States in 1803.
Further on the American position as presented by Jay, Thomas Jefferson
expressed his understanding of the meaning of the right of pre-emption in an opinion he
provided, as Secretary of State, to President George Washington in 1793:
I considered our right of pre-emption of the Indian lands, not as amounting
to any dominion, or jurisdiction, or paramountship whatever, but merely in
the nature of a remainder after the extinguishment of a present right,
which gave us no present right whatsoever, but of preventing other nations
from taking possession, and so defeating our expectancy; that the Indians
had the full, undivided and independent sovereignty as long as they choose
to keep it, and that this might be forever.40
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The understanding that European and American claims to territorial sovereignty were
only valid vis-à-vis one another, and did not diminish the sovereignty of the Indian
nations, is consistent with Chief Justice Marshall’s pronouncement in Worcester v.
Georgia that the doctrine of discovery applied only among the European nations that had
agreed to it, and could not affect the pre-existing rights of the Indian nations, including
their right to independence. It also explains why France, England, and the United States
negotiated treaties with the Indian nations, rather than just entering into real estate
transactions with them to acquire their lands: these nations had, and to some extent
continue to have, sovereignty, and so the colonizing powers had to negotiate with them
on a nation-to-nation basis.41
Modern research into French-Indigenous relations in North America in the 17th
and 18th centuries confirms that France did not claim sovereignty over Indigenous
peoples who were not integrated into the French colonial regime.42 Beyond the French
settlements along the St. Lawrence, the lower Mississippi, and in other isolated locations,
French relations with the Indian nations were commercial in nature, involving acquisition
of furs in exchange for European utensils, blankets, weapons, and other items.
Describing the French presence west of Lake Superior in the period before the cession of
New France to Britain in 1763, historian William Eccles states:
The western posts of the French, all but the main bases Niagara, Detroit,
Michilimackinac, and eventually, Grand Portage, consisted of little more
than a three- to four-meter-high log palisade thirty-odd meters long on each
side, enclosing four or five clay-chinked log cabins with bark roofs. The
“presents” that the French were constrained to give the Indian nations every
year were regarded by the latter as a form of rent for the use of the land
where the posts stood and as a fee for the right to travel on the Indians’
territory.43
See Marshall C.J.’s decisions, discussed above at nn.11-16, and references in n.16. On Indian
treaties, see Prucha, above n.40; Williams, above n.6; James Youngblood [Sákéj] Henderson, Treaty Rights
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The reality was that the French lacked both the capacity and the desire to exercise control
over the territories of the Indigenous peoples who were their commercial partners and with
whom they needed to maintain cordial and respectful relations. But if, at the same time, the
French were able to keep rivals out by asserting sovereignty over these territories vis-à-vis
other European nations, they would be able to monopolize the fur trade and retain the
benefit of it for themselves.
The second body of law we have identified as relevant to the issue of de jure
sovereignty in the Missouri watershed at the time of the Louisiana Purchase is the law of
the Indian nations. Their law would be much more apposite than French law because they
actually inhabited the region and did exercise de facto sovereignty. Included would be
both the internal law of the various Indian nations, and any inter-nation law developed to
govern their diplomatic and commercial relations with one another.44 While ascertaining
the content of these bodies of law prior to European exploration of the Missouri
watershed is no easy task, due in part the temporal distance of well over two centuries
and the fact that these societies relied on oral traditions rather than writing to record their
legal norms, there can be little doubt that the laws of these nations would not have
acknowledged the validity of a proclamation of possession and assertion of sovereignty
expressed at the mouth of the Mississippi by a foreigner who had never even visited their
territories. Evidence of this can be found in the records of the Lewis and Clark
Expedition of 1804 to 1806 that reveal various degrees of bewilderment, scepticism, and
hostility to assertions of American sovereignty.45 Resistance to American authority by
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some Northern Plains Indian nations well into the nineteenth century is further evidence
of their tenacious belief in their own independence.46
As for the law of nations, in the seventeenth century it was still in its infancy. We
have also seen that it was not “international” in any global sense – instead, it was a
European body of law developed in part to regulate the acquisition of overseas colonies
by the European powers. As such, its application would have been limited to the
European nations. It would not bind the Indian nations of the Missouri watershed who did
not participate in its formation and did not consent to be subject to it.
To the extent, however, that there was a body of European law governing the
acquisition of colonies in the late seventeenth century, La Salle’s 1682 declaration of
French possession of the Missouri watershed might have had juridical effect vis-à-vis
other European nations. In fact, Thomas Jefferson viewed the extent of Louisiana as a
matter of law and relied on his understanding of international law, based on the practice
of nations, to support his opinion that the Louisiana Purchase included the entire Missouri
watershed. In a historical manuscript, “The Limits and Bounds of Louisiana”, based on
research he undertook in his own library and dated September 7, 1803, Jefferson wrote:
… the practice of nations, on making discoveries in America, has
sanctioned a principle that “when a nation takes possession of any extent
of sea-coast, that possession is understood as extending into the interior
country to the sources of the rivers emptying within that coast, to all their
branches, and the country they cover.” I. Mem. de l’Amerique 116.47
The quoted passage from “Mem. de l’Amerique” is a loose translation of a memorial,
dated October 4, 1751, that had been presented by French Commissioners to their British
counterparts during negotiations over the boundary between Acadia (Nova Scotia, ceded
by France to Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713) and New France. Significantly,
France’s claim that possession of a sea-coast extends to the sources of its rivers was a
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bargaining position in a diplomatic exchange over the limits of Acadia, not a statement of
the law of nations accepted by the British.48 Jefferson’s conclusion that the practice of
nations had sanctioned such a principle was thus not supported by the materials he relied
upon. Moreover, as the sources of the Acadian rivers referred in the French memorial are
generally less than 50 miles from the sea, this could not serve as a precedent for the vast
Missouri watershed, the headwaters of which are approximately 2500 miles from the
point where the Missouri flows into the Mississippi and 3740 miles from the Gulf of
Mexico. We therefore need to reassess the validity of Jefferson’s understanding of the
practice of nations, and his assumption that France had sovereignty over the entire
Missouri watershed, even vis-à-vis other European nations and the United States, by
examining the law of nations prior to the Louisiana Purchase.49

4.

The Law of Nations, and French and Spanish Possession of the Missouri
Watershed

Actual possession apart, it appears there was no real agreement among the European
nations at the time of La Salle’s assertion of French sovereignty in 1682, the time of the
Louisiana Purchase in 1803, or any time in between, on what was necessary to acquire
sovereignty over territory already inhabited by non-European peoples. In some instances,
conquest or treaties of cession were relied upon. In other cases, the European nations
claimed territorial title by virtue of discovery, papal grants, symbolic acts of possession,
royal charters, or a combination thereof. The method chosen by any particular European
nation to assert sovereignty seems to have been determined more by self-interest and the
social, historical, and diplomatic context than agreed upon legal norms. The Spanish and
48
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Portuguese, for example, relied heavily on discovery and the grants they had received by
papal bulls, whereas the French and the English favored methods such symbolic acts and
royal charters that promoted their own interests.50
French claims derived from La Salle’s 1682 expedition were based upon
discovery and his formal declaration of possession, which he attempted to fortify by
alleging the consent of the Indian nations he had encountered. As a means of asserting
sovereignty, discovery was sometimes relied upon by the French and English to counter
Iberian claims based on prior papal grants.51 However, while discovery combined with a
formal declaration of sovereignty may have accorded some priority to the discovering
power as against other European nations, unless followed by actual possession within a
reasonable time its value even in that context expired.52 It is therefore necessary to
determine the extent to which France was able to make good on La Salle’s actions by
effectively occupying the territory he claimed.53
La Salle’s settlement at Matagorda Bay on the Gulf Coast west of the Mississippi
failed, but in 1686 his companion Henri de Tonti founded Arkansas Post, near the place
where the Arkansas River flows into the Mississippi. Although John Caruso referred to
this post as “the oldest [European] settlement in the Lower Mississippi Valley”, in reality
it initially consisted of a single log house with no more than six French inhabitants.54
Anxious to establish French control of the Lower Mississippi to ward off Spanish and
English claims after the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick, Louis XIV’s Minister of Marine, Louis
Phélypeaux, Comte de Pontchartrain, sent an expedition under Pierre Moyne, Sieur
50
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d’Iberville, to found a colony there.55 In 1699, Iberville built Fort Maurepas on the east
side of Biloxi Bay. The following year, he erected Fort de la Boulage (or Mississippi
Fort) near the mouth of the Mississippi.56 Caruso wrote that this “may have been one of
the most important forts that France built in all of North America”, as it “secured for that
country the vast territory of Louisiana, from which many American states were
eventually carved.”57 Thomas Jefferson was also of the view that the activities of La
Salle, Tonti and Iberville established France’s “formal and actual possession” of the Gulf
Coast from Mobile to Matagorda Bay and up the Mississippi to the Illinois River, which
he thought gave France territorial title by the law of nations over the western watershed
of the Mississippi and its tributaries, including the Missouri.58
Examining the law of nations, there can be little doubt that it would have
accorded sovereignty to France, as against other European states, over territory that was
actually possessed and controlled by her. But would France have had sovereignty over
any territory that was not in her possession and control? In particular, would the
establishment of a French fort near the mouth of the Mississippi, assuming it allowed her
to control access to the Mississippi from the sea, have given France sovereignty over the
distant Missouri watershed, despite the absence of French subjects and the evident fact
that its true possessors were the Indian nations who actually lived there?
Claims to territory adjacent to or inland from a seacoast or river mouth that is
actually possessed are based on geographical contiguity, and are thus said to depend on
the contiguity (or hinterland) doctrine. Significantly, in the first half of the nineteenth
century the main proponent of an expansive interpretation of this doctrine was the United
States itself, first in its dispute with Spain over the south-western boundary of
Louisiana,59 and then with Britain over entitlement to the Oregon country. 60 In each case,

Caruso, above n.29, 225-28. See also John C. Rule, “Jérôme Phélypeaux, Comte de Pontchartrain,
and the Establishment of Louisiana, 1696-1715” in John Francis McDermott, ed., Frenchmen and French
Ways in the Mississippi Valley (Urbana, IL, 1969), 179.
56
See Samuel Wilson, Jr., “Colonial Fortifications and Military Architecture in the Mississippi
Valley”, in John Francis McDermott, ed., The French in the Mississippi Valley (Urbana, IL, 1965), 103 at
105-10.
57
Caruso, above n.29, 237.
58
Jefferson, above n.47, 260-61.
59
See Hall, above n.9, 103-5, and works cited in n.20 above.
55

20
American diplomats self-interestedly contended for a watershed application of the
contiguity doctrine, but ultimately compromised these claims of the United States by
accepting other boundaries.61
As the nineteenth century progressed, international jurists debated both the
validity and the meaning of the contiguity doctrine. If anything like a consensus was
reached, it was that claims to a watershed based on possession of a sea-coast or river
mouth had to be reasonable. While geographical contiguity might be used to claim a
drainage basin up to a not-too-distant range of mountains, the doctrine could not be used
to claim vast territories that extended far beyond the effective occupation and control of
the colonizing nation, especially where possession of a river mouth did not prevent access
to the interior by other routes.62 This had to be especially so in situations where the
interior was not vacant, but was in fact occupied by Indian nations.63 As a consequence,
American claims to the entire Mississippi and Columbia watersheds on the basis of
possession of the mouths of those rivers were generally rejected by international jurists.64
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French possession of the Mississippi, however, was not confined to the river’s
mouth. Starting around the time of the construction of Fort de la Boulage by Iberville in
1700, France established a number of settlements and forts on the Mississippi below the
Missouri, including Cahokia (c. 1696), Kaskaskia (1703), Fort Rosalie (Natchez, 1716),
New Orléans (1718), Baton Rouge (1719), Fort de Chartres (1719), Prairie du Rocher (c.
1722), and Ste. Geneviève (c. 1735).65 French presence on the Missouri River itself was
first established by fur traders and explorers, most notably Étienne Veniard de
Bourgmont and Pierre Gaultier de Varennes, Sieur de La Vérendrye, and his sons.66 In
1714, Bourgmont ascended the Missouri, probably as far as the Platte River. In the winter
of 1723-24, as Commandant of the Missouri River with instructions from Paris to
establish a military post there to counteract Spanish incursions, he built Fort d’Orléans on
the north bank, near the present-day town of Wakenda, Missouri. From there, he
journeyed westward to Padouca, an encampment of Comanches or Plains Apaches, east
of the Big Bend of the Arkansas, where he formed an alliance with the assembled
chiefs.67 William Goetzmann and Glyndwr Williams described this alliance as “stillborn”, as the “faltering French colony of Louisiana could not support so distant an
enterprise, and in 1728 Fort d’Orléans was abandoned.”68 In 1744, however, another
French fort, Cavagnial (or Cavagnolle), was built further upstream, a few miles above the
mouth of the Kansas River near present-day Leavenworth, Kansas. It was apparently
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maintained until 1764, when French forts were evacuated after the cession of Louisiana
to Spain.69
Unlike Bourgmont, La Vérendrye approached the Missouri from the north by
travelling overland from posts he had established on what are now the Canadian Prairies.
In 1738, he reached the Mandan villages near present-day Bismarck, North Dakota. In
1742, in the hope of finding a route to the Pacific, he sent two of his sons, François (the
Chevalier) and Louis-Joseph, back to the Missouri. After visiting the Mandan villages,
they travelled across the Plains and met Indians who may have been Cheyenne around the
Black Hills, and then returned to Mandan country via what were probably Arikara
villages on the Missouri near present-day Pierre, South Dakota.70 While the travels of La
Vérendrye and his sons did not result in any French settlements on the Upper Missouri,
they did open up a fur trade route that was utilized for many years by French Canadian
(and later British) traders, as Lewis and Clark learned first-hand when they arrived at the
Mandan villages in 1804.71
The French did, therefore, explore the Missouri at least as far as the Mandan
villages, and did carry on trade with the Indian nations on the Upper Missouri. They also
established forts on the Lower Missouri, none of which became permanent settlements.
These forts were minor establishments, housing only a few soldiers, traders, and
sometimes their wives and families.72 They would not have enabled France to control the
countryside, as the Indian nations who lived there far outnumbered the French. 73 There
can be no doubt that the French were allowed to pass through Indian territories and
establish an occasional post or fort because the Indian nations valued the trade goods they
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were able to obtain from them, not because the French were militarily superior. Apart
from their occupied posts and forts, French possession and control of the Missouri region
were nonexistent.
After the cession of Louisiana to Spain in 1762, but before the actual transfer, St.
Louis was founded by Pierre de Laclède Liguest in 1764. The first Spanish Governor of
Louisiana, Antoino de Ulloa, sent Captain Francisco Ríu y Morales and a company of 44
men to St. Louis in 1767 to assert Spanish authority over Upper Louisiana. On Ulloa’s
instructions, Ríu commenced construction of two forts on the Missouri, Don Carlos on
the south bank near the confluence with the Mississippi and Charles on the north bank,
for the purposes of controlling the Indians and the fur trade, and preventing the British (to
whom French territory east of the Mississippi had been ceded by the Treaty of Paris in
1763) from ascending the Missouri and establishing settlements. However, construction
of Fort Charles may not have been completed, and Fort Don Carlos was evacuated in
1769 after the French inhabitants of New Orléans revolted. Thereafter, Spain
administered Upper Louisiana from St. Louis, without ever establishing a substantial
Spanish population there.74 French settlers, however, did establish a permanent
community on the north bank of the Missouri about 21 miles upstream from the
Mississippi in 1769, first called Les Petites Côtes and later St. Charles.75 Beyond that,
apparently no attempt was made by the Spanish to establish forts or settlements on the
Missouri until the 1790s.
Alarmed by their inability to exclude British traders from the Upper Missouri,
Spanish authorities finally reacted by sending three successive expeditions up the river.
While neither Jean Batiste Truteau (1794-96) nor Antoine Simon Lecuyer (1795) reached
the Mandan villages and built the fort they were supposed to establish there, Scotsman
James Mackay (1795-97) was more successful.76 On behalf of the Spanish Governor and
the St. Louis merchants who had formed the Missouri Company, he ascended the river
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and built a trading house just north of the Platte, and Fort Charles somewhat further
upstream at the Omaha village of Chief Black Bird. From there, Mackay sent his
lieutenant, Welshman John Evans, to search for a route from the Missouri to the Pacific.
Evans reached the Mandan villages, and took possession of a fort there that belonged to
British traders, over which he hoisted the Spanish flag. However, this assertion of
Spanish authority was short-lived, as both Mackay and Evans returned to St. Louis in
1797, after which Spanish and British traders continued to compete in the Upper Missouri
country,77 though neither Spain nor Britain had possession or control, as the real masters
of the region were still the Indian nations.78 This is confirmed by the fact that Lewis and
Clark had to negotiate their way up the Missouri and present suitable gifts to the leaders
of the nations whose territories they traversed.79
Such was the extent of European possession of the Missouri when Louisiana was
transferred back to France in 1800 and then to the United States in 1803.80 One
permanent French settlement (St. Charles, a few miles up the Missouri) had been
established, and a few French and Spanish posts and forts of minor proportions had been
built and then abandoned. French, Spanish and British fur traders all operated on the
Missouri, but did not hold possession of any territory for their respective governments.
The reality was that, apart from a small area near the mouth of the river, in 1803 the
Indian nations were as much in possession of the Missouri watershed and were as
sovereign as they had been at the time of La Salle’s fanciful declaration of French
possession in 1682. The meagre European presence along the Missouri was at the
sufferance of the Indian nations, not the other way around.
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So even if one were to ignore the Eurocentric state of the so-called law of nations
and the difficulty of applying it to Indian nations that were outside its scope, that body of
law would not have given France or Spain territorial sovereignty over any but a tiny
portion of the Missouri watershed. Given that La Salle’s declaration was not followed by
effective occupation of the Missouri region, it would not have resulted in French
sovereignty there.81 The only territory that could have passed from France to Spain in
1762 was the territory actually possessed by France as Louisiana. Nor was Spain
successful in extending its possession of the Missouri watershed beyond a small area near
the mouth of the river. So when Spain retroceded the territory to France in 1800 and
France transferred it to the United States in 1803, virtually none of the Missouri
watershed would have been included.

5.

Conclusion

This article concludes that the Louisiana Purchase could not have included more than a
tiny fraction of the Missouri watershed because France did not have territorial
sovereignty, either de facto or de jure in the European law of nations, over most of the
vast region in 1803. However, while France cannot have transferred a title that it did not
have to the United States, this does not obliterate the significance of the Purchase on the
Northern Plains. The fact remains that Jefferson thought the United States had acquired
sovereignty over the entire Missouri watershed in 1803, and the American government
acted accordingly. The Purchase eliminated France as a colonial rival in the region, and
Britain and Spain subsequently settled their territorial claims with the United States by
agreeing on the international boundaries that were established along the 49th parallel to
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the Rocky Mountains by the Convention of Commerce of 181882 and along the 42nd
parallel to the Pacific by the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819.83
The significance of the conclusion that the Louisiana Purchase included very little
of the Missouri watershed therefore lies mainly in the relationship between the United
States and the Indian nations who lived, and continue to live, there. The Purchase did not,
and could not, provide the United States with territorial sovereignty over the Indian
nations who were the true masters of most of that vast region in 1803. So despite what
Jefferson may have thought, when Meriwether Lewis and William Clark ascended the
Missouri River to the Rocky Mountains in 1804-05, they were traversing Indian, not
American, territory. Nor would their Corps of Discovery have acquired sovereignty over
the Missouri watershed for the United States, as they were no more able to take
possession of the region and exercise authority over the Indian nations than their French
and Spanish precursors had been. In actual fact, American sovereignty, both de facto and
de jure, was not acquired until much later, as settlement extended west of the Mississippi
and the Indian nations were brought under American control by military force and treaty.
The Indian treaties on the Northern Plains are therefore not simply land transactions
whereby the United States acquired real property rights from Indian nations who were
already under American sovereignty. They are nation-to-nation agreements that are as
much about territorial sovereignty as they are about land, and need to be understood as
such.84 Of course, this extension of American sovereignty did not happen all at once – it
was a gradual process that was probably not complete until sometime between the Battle
of the Little Big Horn in 1876 and the Massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890. As a
consequence, the American frontier in the Missouri watershed was not just a frontier of
settlement. It was an international boundary between the United States and the Indian
nations that was gradually pushed north and west as these nations were incorporated into
the United States, and became, in Chief Justice Marshall’s words, “domestic dependent
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nations” that nonetheless retained their own internal sovereignty.85 Until that happened,
the Indian nations were the only sovereigns on the Northern Plains.

85

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, above n.13. See text accompanying nn.13-16 above.

